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Science and Society
Una nova naturalesa que ve de la
ciència i la societat
Fernando Sancén i Anita Gramigna
Abstract
The changes that our society is going through nowadays, brought about by its dynamic relationship with 
science and technology, requires a new philosophy, a new ethic, a new symbolic universe, in order to understand 
this dynamism and above all to intervene in the direction in which science is leading society. This paper offers a 
new view of science and ethics based on the Philosophy of Organism. Based on this philosophy, ethics necessarily 
focuses on the rational subject; action constitutes its being and its environment. This article emphasises the power-
ful influence of science and technology in forming our current society, and the need to direct its development. The 
importance of nanoscience and nanotechnologies are mentioned as an important factor in determining the current 
changes in our society, and we postulate the urgent intervention of society in order to direct them based on a philo-
sophical reflection.
Keywords: ethics, technoscience, education, relationship.
Resum
Els canvis que avui viu la nostra societat, generats a partir de la seva relació dinàmica amb la ciència i la 
tecnologia, requereixen una nova filosofia, una nova ètica, un nou univers simbòlic, per comprendre el dinamisme i 
sobretot per intervenir en la direcció en què la ciència condueix la societat. Aquest treball ofereix una nova visió de 
la ciència i l’ètica basada en la filosofia de l’organisme. Basant-se en aquesta filosofia, l’ètica se centra necessària-
ment entorn del subjecte racional, l’acció el constitueix a ell mateix i al seu entorn. Aquest article emfatitza la 
poderosa influència de la ciència i la tecnologia per conformar la nostra actual societat, i la necessitat de dirigir el 
seu desenvolupament. Esmentam la importància de les nanociències i les nanotecnologies com un factor important 
que determina els canvis actuals en la nostra societat, i postulam la urgent intervenció de la societat per dirigir-les a 
partir d’una reflexió filosòfica.
Paraules clau: ètica, tecnociència, educació, relació.
Aquest article fou aprovat per publicar-lo el desembre de 2014.
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Introduction
Never before has human society been as conscious as it is today of its changing life. 
Besides the serious problems suffered for centuries, like inequality, hunger, discrimination, 
poverty, wars, and unemployment, it faces today the risk arising from technology. Today, the 
existence of humanity is already different than before; it has brought back to consciousness 
the fragility of its existence on the planet, not only because of a possible atomic catastrophe 
worldwide, but also due to progressive environmental degradation. This complex situation 
worsens when we consider the rush of those changes.
We are living now in a world constructed by technology, not only because humanity 
has constructed one second nature (Edelman, 2006) but because, besides the transformation 
of the world, man is becoming another ‘itself’, insofar as he improves his power to use 
nature as a domesticated one, and also because now he wants to transform himself, looking 
for a permanent improvement of his own existence. In fact, man seeks a better life not only 
through external goods (automobiles, entertainment, etc.), nor even through the improvement 
of his image (plastic surgery), but now seeks to give himself and his descendants a new way 
of existence that he decides for himself, and the actual technology makes it possible. The 
results of science and technology in our world and in our society perform new organizations 
for work, new politics, and all that has changed our society, introducing new ways of life, new 
values, new customs. We can say that they have formed a new ethos, abandoning, maybe with 
nostalgia, the past times. S&T have also changed man’s vision; he thinks and acts differently 
than in the past. Actually, the power acquired by man, derived of the knowledge he has of the 
world, and growing faster and radically, gives rise to a new world and a new human being. 
But assuming that social change is continuous, some questions come necessarily: what will 
be the new reality of man and of his surroundings? Who decides it? The inertia indicates 
that the oppressive structure now effective worldwide will determine the answers to these 
questions. That is to say, there are a few powerful men all over the world who, moved by their 
own interests, will impose direction onto the new worldwide society generated by the power 
that grants them science and technology. Even if society laboriously looks for the solution 
to the problems resulting from S&T, the social structure where they are produced will not 
change if the cognitive structure will not. In fact, it is almost impossible to provide a solution 
to those problems if the structure causing them is continuous and unchanging.
The relationship between knowledge about nature and the power brought about by this 
knowledge leads to the relationship between science and ethics. Philosophy must bring this 
situation to social consciousness and construct a new symbolic universe, a new conceptual 
structure capable of explaining and correctly measuring up the actual conditions of humanity 
and suggesting the direction that humanity’s change should take. In fact, it is necessary to 
explain and orientate the transforming power that science and technology have nowadays and 
will have in the future.
This paper aims towards deep thought about ethics from the relationship between 
science and society, taking into account that the main subject of ethics is the human act, and 
that this act is determined by knowledge about the world: that is to say, by science (Morin, 
2001). This relationship shows a great dynamism, besides any absolute knowing, and human 
knowledge constitutes the axis joining them. Action, indeed, is grounded in knowledge, 
although it is fair to indicate that knowledge is also a form of acting (Piaget, 1970). We 
discuss the role and challenges of ethics, starting from the dynamical relationship between 
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science and society, assuming that such a relationship is the starting point of new forms of 
existence and acting to the individuals.
Society and Science
The power man has acquired over nature through science is paradoxically originated 
in his own nature. Thanks to his rational nature, man has been able to create a second nature, 
bringing into reality new potentialities and new forms of existence of the world, and precisely 
of nature. This has been explained by Spinoza’s expression emphasizing the contrast between 
natura naturans, and natura naturata: man has naturalized nature, impressing on it his 
rationality as a seal. Being the owner of his own actions, so long as man acts, he determines, 
and at the same time he gives form to his own physical, living and social surroundings. 
Only man gives meaning to the world and, in doing so, he seeks, collaborating with other 
individuals, his own good through the conformation of a world, seeking in that way his 
own satisfaction (Berger, 1967). But these changes conform also in man himself a new 
nature, new possibilities to understand and to explain the world. Man is able to explain the 
way these changes come into the theoretical construction (science) of the world. In fact, 
the human action has modified the nomos of our societies throughout human history and, 
as a consequence, has also modified their interpretative schemes, their moral principles, 
expressions of the traditional wisdom: that is to say, their Weltanschauung. This situation is 
also dynamical due to changes coming, and is also creative because a new reality comes into 
existence, a new nature comes into nature itself (natura naturata), and also into man’s nature 
insofar as he knows the world and acts on it.
The knowledge a human being has about the world, and his action on it, drives us to 
ethics. We propose an ethics grounded in the permanent construction of our world thanks 
to the knowledge of nature, but also thanks to the construction of a new world based on 
that knowledge. This position encounters other thoughts about ethics we must consider. We 
are specifically talking about the Kantian consideration of ethics. Therefore, we examine 
briefly the philosophical meaning attached to Kant’s thought, expressed by Herbert Marcuse 
and Jürgen Habermas. We start off the original critique Hegel addressed to Kant about 
the abstraction of historicity to construct the categorical imperative by the subject itself 
(Habermas, 1991). In fact, neither Marcuse nor Habermas take into account the changing 
historical existence of man to construct their moral norms. In fact, these authors separate 
science and ethics, even at an ontological level, denying the way their intimate relationship 
modifies a society’s world view: that is to say, their nomos or Weltaunschaung. Marcuse 
(1966), for instance, establishes an existential separation between science (the true) and 
ethics (the good); he maintains that besides the form science has to define the objectivity of 
nature and its parts, this scientific knowledge cannot be conceived as «final cause»: that is to 
say, as the origin of practical reason. He thinks that the ontological league between logos and 
éros (science and ethics or values) is broken, and maintains that scientific rationality appears 
essentially like morally neutral. Therefore, since values are separated from objective reality, 
they are subjective; they are not real. Consequently, ethics is separated from science on an 
ontological level.
In this way, the relationship between science and values, between scientific objectivity 
and subjective values, appears an abysmal divorce between science and ethics. Marcuse, 
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despite such duality (science–truth and ethics–good), accepts the rationality of science and 
recognizes that scientific knowledge, for its objectivity, is more and more dependent on the 
individual and proposes to start from an organic metaphysics, where the subject can be the 
origin and aim of the scientific objectivity. He talks, in fact, about the presence of a constituent 
subject, but only in the field of science, aside from morality. Nevertheless, he contends that 
despite the form as science defining the objectivity of nature and its parts, they cannot be 
conceived as “final causes”: that is to say, as the origin of practical reason.
Habermas, for his own part, agrees with the existence of pragmatic backgrounds, 
but he doesn’t accept that science could be part of them, discarding all possibility of éthos’ 
intervention in building moral principles. For him, the field of history belongs to practice, 
and it cannot take part in moral constitution because it doesn’t belong to the field of justice; 
it belongs to that of science (Habermas, 1991). Specifically, talking about modern science, he 
maintains that science and philosophy have been forced to abandon the idea of a knowledge 
grounded in metaphysical principles, and therefore, since the moral is based on universality, 
he is forced to resign the presence of science, and consequently of éthos, in the constitution 
of moral universalism; that is to say, he must radically separate science from ethics. 
Nevertheless, it is to be recognized that in Habermas’ writings lies the idea of the subject and 
of his transcendental value to establish, in an intersubjective communication, the best moral 
argument, obtaining in that way the moral universalism he postulates.
Indeed, Habermas perceives as much as Marcuse the determining importance of the 
subject in science –of this worthy universe they attribute to it –and in ethics. It would seem 
that they are opening spaces to ethics tied up with science, insofar as they criticize science 
from a moral position. They argue, in fact, that technology derived from science has been 
used as a «form of social control and domination». They insist, nevertheless, paradoxically, 
that such domination and control are originated in scientific rationality, which they consider 
neutral: that is to say, besides morality. For them, theoretical reason, which is pure and neutral, 
becomes subject to practical reason, resulting in a domination of technology over society, 
represented now in practical reason, whose domination is perpetuated and generalized not 
only through technology but like technology. Consequently, we can see that as much as 
Marcuse and Habermas first put forward the neutrality of science, they later maintain that its 
application is a mechanism of oppression in our society. They consider that theoretical reason 
obeys only the laws of rationality besides the phenomenical or changing world, explaining 
as a reverse situation man’s oppression through science and technology. They maintain that 
values and culture obtain the legitimacy, although subjective, of technology, but this does 
not justify its objectivity, and it therefore remains outside of ethics. These positions about 
science and ethics expressed by these authors are contradictory; they first try to demonstrate 
the neutrality of science, and then they denounce man’s oppression caused by science, which 
they interpret as the submission of theoretical reason to practical reason.
On the other hand, the problem of society’s oppression originated in science, since 
it has to do with the material and social world, will be better approached starting with an 
epistemological analysis that necessarily should be completed by an ontological explanation 
of knowledge itself. Firstly, it is necessary to accept that human knowledge is not constructed 
to search the metaphysical principles of theoretical reason, but has a primary material and 
pragmatic aim; that is to say, it is orientated to the existence of the knower itself. In this work, 
we cannot prove how science is a logical construction starting from sensations accompanied 
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always by imagination, by previous knowledge, or by prior experiences, etc.1 Nevertheless, 
we take as the foundation of our work such an explanation of knowledge. Human knowledge 
is a theoretical activity, a process, and constitutes the source and foundation of human acting, 
attributed by Kantians to practical reason. Taking into account its material and biological 
grounds, the explanation of human knowledge determines the sense of scientific and common 
knowledge, and can therefore also give reason to the world vision conformed by man, who 
adds a sense to each of his actions (ethics). We should insist that in studying the problem of 
human knowledge we must conduct a cognitive activity that is unique; we must, therefore, 
distinguish it and bring it theoretical foundations. In that way, the constructivist explanation 
of knowledge deeply completed by the actual neurosciences gives the fundamental concepts 
to ground the non-neutrality of science and its entailment with the éthos of human society and 
with its biological dimension (Changeux, 2002).
Piaget (1970) explains knowledge as a unique activity that constructs theoretic 
explanations to be validated by sensible data; and the formation of science, even if it is a 
theoretical construction, is originated in physical perception and also in theoretic explanations 
previously formed that constitute a cognitive structure, always present in the act of knowing 
and permanently changing as a result of knowing itself. Therefore, perceptions and cognitive 
structures always come together to determine the act of knowing. Human knowledge, and 
one of its results, science, has to be seen more as a creative construction and transformation 
(Edelman, 2006) than as abstraction through which the knower obtains universal notions. 
The outcome of such a construction is the cognitive structure that is related with physical 
perception: that is to say, with the object of our knowledge. We call these results symbols 
insofar as they are the result of sensation and cognitive structure present and acting in the 
knower in the same act of knowing. Science, for its own part, builds up a symbolic universe 
that has been validated by experiments. In this way, scientists confirm their hypotheses 
and obtain the certainty that the single phenomenon will act in accordance with scientific 
propositions validated previously in the experiments. In what concerns society, science acts 
in two directions of human acting: it deeply affects knowledge about the world, and also 
affects its relationship with nature when the knower obtains through scientific knowledge the 
goods required for human existence. Besides all that, it must be said that modern science has 
radically changed the concept of truth; nowadays, the inductive procedures to explain and 
to manipulate nature are considered as normal (truth), even if science is not absolutely truth. 
Now, if science permanently transforms the world, the man, his thoughts, and societies, it 
must be said that, as far as science is a process of knowledge about the world, reciprocally 
that scientific knowledge is influenced by previous knowledge accumulated in society. In 
this way, we can say that changes in scientific knowledge are influenced by society, which 
has problems to resolve and has an accumulated knowledge that serves as the origin of the 
scientific investigation. But the dynamical and reciprocal processes of modifying science 
and society must be explained by new theoretical and epistemological theories. Now we see 
that the fact of a science permanently tied with society, and the interaction between them, 
drives us to a new vision about ethics firmly related with this dynamism and with changes in 
1 The elements of a new development about human knowledge can be seen, among others, in the writings of 
philosophers and scientists such as Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1945); Jean Piaget, 
psychologie et épistemologie (1970); J. E. McGuire & Barbara Tuchanska, Science Unfettered: A Philosophical 
Study in Sociohistorical Ontology (2001); Philip Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001); Gerald Edelman 
& Giulio Tononi, A universe of consciousness: How matter becomes imagination (2000).
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the operating structure of society. In fact, we can see a changing éthos in each society due to 
changes coming from science and technology.
Taking into account the power science and technology give to transform the world 
and man himself, a power that extends itself limitlessly throughout space and time, it is 
reasonable to leave aside the moral and theoretical neutrality of science towards the society 
that separates the supposedly disinterested search of objectivity in the name of so-called 
double reason. Indeed, it turns out more coherent to see all knowledge constructed from a 
historical situation of the knower –scientific knowledge is not an exception– because the 
human being cannot accede to an absolute and definitively stable truth about the world, 
nor about moral norms. Therefore, the scientific and technological activities belonging to 
history are fully charged of suppositions not compatible with the moral neutrality demanded 
of scientific and technological knowledge. On the contrary, there is a permanent interaction 
between human thought or knowledge and human acting; in such a way it is necessary to 
approach the problem of the relationship between science (knowledge) and ethics (action) 
starting from the subject’s perspective because he acts based on his own knowledge. It must 
be added to the dynamism of knowledge that the individual is at the origin of scientific and 
technological knowledge. Therefore, the rational subject is at the centre of the dynamical 
relation between science and society. In fact, towards him science and technology go on, and 
through his acting he is at the origin of the world and of himself. But the rational subject also 
needs society for his existence and is at once the cause of his society. The fact of dynamical 
change in societies throughout human history taking its ground from human knowledge about 
the world and in his consequent action, demands, besides the epistemological explanation, 
an ontological one, leaving aside the matter-spirit dualism, even if such a dualism has been 
the central paradigm in philosophy for several centuries. That implies a recognition that the 
change in knowledge about world introduces changes also into society through human action, 
and also implies taking into account that science itself has pragmatically pushed away the 
concept of absolute truth. All that points to overcoming the common dualism in occidental 
thought that sees two realities: one which exists (material) and another which is thought, 
belonging to the spiritual soul. The ontological explanation of reality we now propose will 
take as its fundamental argument the unique and permanent physical interrelation in which 
runs the existence of the subject who acts and knows, being part of an interacting universal 
reality. Moreover, an epistemology that explains human knowledge as a result of the 
physical and theoretical interaction of the knower with his surroundings demands a further 
explanation about the dynamism of reality. Taking into account the subject’s central role 
in that relationship, we point out at once his responsibility derived from his cognitive and 
transforming action that transcends himself and extends to his own society and to nature in 
its entirety. All that necessarily drives us to ethics; but before we speak about the relationship 
between ethics and science, we would like to speak about its ontological basis.
In fact, the introduction of ethics into the development of S&T demands the awareness 
and acceptance of the explanatory principles of society’s transformation in the present and 
in the future that is already being constructed. But at the same time must be known the 
transforming power of science itself, of human knowledge or world view and of éthos: that is 
to say, of society itself. All that we have said until now leads us to outline the main terms of 
an ontology explaining the dynamism of S&T, as we have insisted.
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Dynamism in our Society
Until now, we have said that the individual is at the centre of the epistemology; his 
knowledge about the world and his actions upon it come through S&T. Therefore, S&T set up 
the core of ethics and ontology. A naturalistic ethics turning on a knowledge of norms, when 
abandoning the characteristic dynamism of human knowledge, turns out as absolute and 
contrary to man itself. In the same way, an ethics grounded on justice and good as absolutely 
valid principles loses the historic processuality that is characteristic of the human being. Now 
we must see that in our actual society S&T can be tied to an ontological explanation allowing 
us to recognize them as an important fact, or datum, in the universal process of becoming. In 
such a way, their epistemological and ethical characteristics would be plenty understood as 
part of human existence.
In contrast to the Kantian ethics, S&T must be taken into account in conforming an 
ethics turned to the actual situation of humanity, and also turned to the future that is being 
constructed by all individuals living today in our societies. Taking into account the dynamism 
of human existence, the social ethics must confront not only today’s challenges of humanity, 
but also it is forced to reflect on the future of man and nature that are being changed by 
science and technology. There we see one of the great changes that necessarily must be 
taken into account nowadays by the social and philosophical disciplines. These changes 
originated in human acting in S&T must be explained by the universal principles by which is 
also explained the individual action. Since the human action ties man himself not only with 
other individuals in a society, but also with the material and living world, those principles 
must necessarily be viewed as strongly related, from the concreteness of individual acting, 
to the universality of being. Hans Jonas (1977) says that the last answer of ontology could 
be the basis of man’s duty, and maintains that reflecting on duty should come back again to 
reflecting about being. This spiral that passes throughout the constitution of human being 
(ontology) and its action (ethics) faithfully reflects the dynamism in society caused by S&T 
and shows its entailment with individual action (ethics) and with the existence of being itself.
An ethics originated in the dynamism of human action determined by S&T coming 
until the universality of being must be grounded in such an ontology that takes this 
dynamism into account. Indeed, in order to construct a dynamic ethics that approaches the 
dynamics of actual science, it is necessary to establish how reality is a universe conforming 
itself permanently by the physical interaction of everything that exists. Quite briefly, we 
propose an ontological explanation of being itself that is a brief résumé of the Cosmology 
developed by Alfred North Whitehead (1979): the actual world is a permanent and 
uninterrupted process of physical presence by which all entities existing in the Universe are 
constituted and permanently changing. In that sense, the world must be seen as a process 
of permanent becoming of everything that exists; thus, the being of an entity permanently 
constitutes itself by his becoming into existence as a creative synthesis of the interaction 
it has with its surroundings. The way each entity becomes is by its physical relationship 
with its surroundings: each entity exists so long as it prehends or perceives other things in 
its surroundings; all being, consequently, exists by the prehensions it has of other entities; 
these prehensions, in fact, are sensible data coming from physical perception, and each entity 
integrates them selectively in its own becoming (Whitehead, 1979). The result of interaction 
and prehensions is the existence, the becoming, of each entity that exists. Whitehead insists 
that from this point of view, it follows that the concept of `subject’ applied to each entity 
2. Sancén Gramigna.indd   37 16/10/15   9:25
Sancén, F. i Gramigna, A.
38
loses its connotation of substratum (subjectum) to which we are accustomed via Aristotelian 
thought; otherwise, now, so far as each subject is the result of the interaction it has and 
prehends from its surroundings, etymologically the subject would be seen as a super-ject 
(super-jectum). In other words, each entity comes to existence from the interacting universe 
in which and by which it is constituted as a creative synthesis. As a result of all this, we are 
now facing a new vision of reality: a universe in which creativity constitutes the fundamental 
characteristic of each being, a reality in permanent process, a dynamism inherent to the 
existence of all entities (Sancén, 2003).
In this theoretical context, we can see that the world expresses the dynamism by which 
all beings exist and manifest their permanent interaction as their own form of existence. 
Consequently, based on this ontology, whose main characteristics are creative dynamism and 
its universality, the suggestion of a new ethics makes sense as a historical ethics grounded in 
the changes of éthos. These changes, as has been said, bring out a new society, a new éthos 
which can be seen throughout the history of humanity. These traits of an ontology, considering 
the reality as a process, establish S&T as a datum or fact conforming all individuals and 
societies. At the same time, these traits express the dynamism and creativity explaining 
society itself. From this point of view, by his acting, the individual maintains an existential 
and constituent relationship not only with his fellow being, but also with his social, biological 
and physical surroundings, where he reaches his transforming action. In what concerns the 
ethical dimension of science, the individual holds the centre. Actually, he is the rational 
subject who decides the viability and financing of research projects and the development 
of emergent technologies, such as nanotechnologies; he is the subject who achieves these 
projects; it is he who produces the goods derived from him and who brings them to the 
market, and it is also he who incorporates them into his daily routine; all that is turned to the 
future not only of each individual, but of the whole of the Universe. Therefore, everything 
that is present in human action constitutes the object of ethics; and science, as knowledge 
about the world, is the main element of such actions. In this way, science and technology 
necessarily occupy a predominant position in the construction of an ethics concerned with 
the future of our societies.
Based on this historical view, and on the changes that are nowadays being continuously 
introduced by S&T into our society, it is necessary to think about an historical ethics, as 
historic as man and science; an ethics that includes as its own field the human being and his 
social, biological and physical surroundings, to which the individual is existentially tied. To 
sum up, it is necessary to think about a dynamic ethics in accordance with the process in which 
man exists. This ontological explanation brings us to think about an ethics whose central 
point is, as we have said, the acting man and all that comes together with his action: that is 
to say, the éthos, the past and the future of the rational subject and that of his environment. 
Science and Social Norms
Explaining reality as a process provides the theoretical elements that are necessary 
to, firstly, understand the relevance of the relationship between science and society, and 
secondly, to approach the analysis of individual actions as part of a community forged with 
norms it has constructed. 
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We have emphasized the permanent change that society suffers in its structure, in its 
world vision, and in its expectations towards the future, and we have pointed out that all this 
is caused by the scientific and technological activities associated with the introduction of 
devices to benefit the lives of individuals. We maintain the idea now that the dynamic change 
of science and society is an aspect of the permanent process of becoming in the universe. 
The characteristic trait of such a process of change in society comes from human action 
originated in knowledge about reality, and also in the good that man tries to reach when he 
acts. We have also highlighted that both knowledge and intention are present in each human 
action and that they are involved in a symbolism expressing the individual interpretation of 
the world and in the social structure which is maintained and reproduced by human action. 
Therefore, science necessarily points us to such an ethics whose characteristics come from 
its epistemological postulates and its practical applications. An ethics looking to establish 
a direction towards S&T, accepting their dynamism and change, must also be a dynamic 
one. That is why we propose an ethics centred on the subject as acting, testing the change in 
himself and conscious of the transformation of his environment. In this way, such an ethics 
will consider the future as a normative criterion, because the permanent process of change 
is also a creative process from inside society that comes from innovative S&T causes within 
it. But at the core of this creativity expressed by the interaction of an acting subject with all 
entities, as its origin and its result, is the rational subject: man himself. Therefore, the ethics 
we propose will be seeking each individual as constructing his own future and that of his 
environment. Moreover, the outlining of the properties of a new ethics that come from an 
ontology seeking the reality as process puts us in the way of social responsibility regarding 
science and technology. More than grounding what must be done seeking only past moral 
rules, a dynamical ethics will be occupied in thinking about what to do in the future, mainly 
in respect of science and technology, characterized by the dynamism we see in introducing 
permanent changes in the theoretical explanations, and in the applications they realize from 
the world’s knowledge that they construct. This dynamical ethics, grounded in the process 
of becoming, takes into account the requirements of universality, obligatoriety (good) and 
historicity to which all ethics must respond.
The universality of a dynamical ethics comes from the ontological explanation 
declaring that all that exists is process, pure becoming, and where the fundamental category 
is creativity through physical interaction. This universality brings two fundamental axes to 
ethics: on the one hand, the subject’s action – that is to say, the universal form in which exists 
all entities; on the other hand, the constituent relation that links together the acting subject 
with all entities. In that way, human acting is equivalent of being, and at the same time it is 
existentially related with the Universe. The obligatoriety comes from the good determined 
by the subject in action, but such good implies not only the particular subject but also its 
surroundings, because from this one arises (proceeds) the good is obtained by each subject. 
The historicity of ethics comes from its epistemological dimension. In fact, knowing involves 
the knower’s past acting as datum in the knowledge itself. Further, this knowledge will be, in 
its turn, a datum for successive knowing activities.
These characteristic traits of ethics, we propose, express its creative dynamism. 
Such a dynamic vision of ethics contrasts with the Western philosophical tradition, with 
our culture, and with the current world view. Nevertheless, a glance at the dynamism we 
postulate for ethics based on the ontology developed in the Philosophy of Organism and on 
philosophy developed in Ancient Greece demonstrates that the main ideas of dynamism in 
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reality and of ontological process were present not only in the Presocratic philosophers but 
also in the classics, whose ideas are at the origin of Western civilization. For instance, Plato, 
when talking about the teaching of virtue, asks himself: how can we teach virtue if we do not 
own the knowledge of the Absolute Good? When a guide leads us to the top of a mountain 
we can trust him because, as the guide he is, he knows the summit and therefore the way to 
reach it. But we, how can we say that we teach virtue –that is, the way to achieve good– if we 
do not own the idea of good? (Menon, 89 BC). The idea of good is strange to the man who 
never reaches it; he must continuously search for it in a physical reality that is synonymous 
of change. Therefore, man cannot act in accordance with Absolute Good. That is the tragedy 
of Platonism. Aristotle, in his Nicomaquean Ethics, maintains that being is synonymous with 
activity, and that entities exist and are visible only through life and perception: «We exist so 
long as we act, that is to say, insofar as we live and we act» (1168ª); «Being means to us to 
perceive or to think» (1170ª). Aristotle speaks clearly about a process because perception 
means physical interaction insofar as life means interaction with other entities. We can see 
that even if the ethics we propose is more directly tied to the results of modern science, 
it is not dissimilar to a dynamic vision of reality that can be glimpsed in the Platonic and 
Aristotelian philosophy. In fact, they also take into account, specifically Aristotle, the science 
of their epoch. 
Current S&T, for reasons we have outlined, drive us to construct a new ethics; an ethics 
arising from the main role they play in our society in permanently configuring the changing 
éthos in all societies; an ethics appointed to the necessary surpassing of the discourse that 
proposes a scientific orientation first to investigate obtaining results, and only after that, 
to take care of the ethical and political implications. With George Khushf (2006), among 
other natural and social scientists, we consider that it is necessary to form a new culture of 
scientific research and of the commercial development of technology, where ethical thinking 
will be integrated permanently in that research, in politics and in the institutions dedicated 
to education, science and culture. In this way, we have left out such ethics whose main 
interest is to construct absolute norms, predominantly concerning the duty of the human 
being to submit his actions to those norms. With an ethics centred on the subject, the moral 
responsibility does not depend on the observation, per se, of norms, but it resides in the total 
development of a human being’s existence and that of his surroundings, as he looks to the 
future. 
Viewing an ethics engaged with the congruence of human action vis-à-vis norms, 
looking for a correct formation of universal norms and the application of such norms to 
guide concrete human action, and also seeing that science and technology does not take into 
account the justice and goodness specifically related to members of our societies, even if in 
reality they are tied with social circumstances that bring together all human beings, S&T 
should adopt a new form of acting in such a way that they will approach the problem of good 
and justice, taking into account their force in conforming man and society. 
In that way, we can see some ethical concepts, such as Norm, Good, Responsibility, 
Creativity, Future, etc., and try to understand how good and justice can be sought in concrete 
human acting.
The new ethics sees the norm as an expression of the physical and cultural conditions 
of society. This expression –the norm– has a sense because it tends to benefit the existence 
of each human being who belongs to that society: insofar as the norm expresses the idea of 
good in and for each society, it gains compulsoriness for its members. Therefore, the norm 
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expresses the conditions in which each rational subject can reach his own good, and seeking 
it, he favours necessarily the good of other individuals in society. The individual is at the 
origin of norms and their last objective is the rational subject who, insofar as he acts, searches 
for his own good. This one consists, as has already been indicated, of remaining in existence; 
that is to say, into permanence of being. Therefore, the norms must be seen as an historical 
construction that can change if the circumstances determining the social and individual good 
suffer some modifications.
The idea of human good is present in all physical interaction and it comes into being 
by the idea each man has about himself, and by the election of what he wants to obtain 
with his action. Since the idea of individual good for each subject is determined by himself, 
and since when obtaining his own good by acting his existence becomes as a new being, it 
can be said that each subject (super-ject) is the cause of itself (causa sui). In other words, 
each man, thanks to his own action, is the origin of himself. Therefore, the final cause, in 
the context of a dynamic ethics, acquires a different meaning; that is to say, it will be seen 
no longer as justification of the practical reason. In fact, one’s own good constitutes the 
motor of any human action, and consists, in the first and last instance, of conserving itself 
as existing. This is not an exclusive property of man; in fact, so long as any physical or 
biological entity, such as an atom or a cell, prehends other entities of its environment, it 
secures its own good. That is to say, it can remain in existence as a result of its physical 
interaction. This idea of good, nevertheless, is only attainable through the existence –the 
good– of «the other»; that is to say, the good for each entity, including man himself, is only 
possible through interaction with other entities because on this depends the good of acting’s 
subject; out of the other’s existence non-existence is possible. It is useful to add that man’s 
action requires the perception and explanation of the world that results from his own past. 
The final cause of his action is the human being itself, but it must be said that the good he 
looks for exists only in his environment, and that we postulate a fusion of human being and 
nature in terms of final cause.
Therefore, the moral responsibility does not limit itself to well-being or happiness 
of a rational subject, because the human action reaches necessarily not only his immediate 
environment but also other entities which are distant in space and time, as we can see 
through the history. Indeed, since man can only exist in interaction with his surroundings, the 
responsibility derived from his action necessarily reaches «the other», who is not anything 
else but his own environment, the world. Taking into account that throughout S&T the human 
being reaches his own good, it must be said that knowledge about the world expressed 
pragmatically by S&T is today the most important issue for Philosophy and Ethics, and a 
determinant concern of responsibility to each subject in our society: scientists, technicians, 
academics, politicians, investors, consumers, legislators, industrialists, etc. In fact, the 
rational subject’s responsibility for his action necessarily reaches S&T so long as they are a 
determinant element in obtaining his own good and that of his surroundings. Therefore, the 
direction and dimension of S&T should constitute a central commitment for today’s society, 
specifically for ethics and philosophy, starting from sociology. 
We have seen that human acting is simultaneously the result and the cause as much of 
man himself as of his surroundings. Indeed, action is always performed coming from a pre-
existent situation previously determined by the individual, and at the same time by society 
(social habits, values, customs, etc.). In such a situation, the decision of acting comes from the 
idea of good and any action always creates a new occasion, a new entity, insofar as something 
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new comes from this action; it also becomes a modification in the environment insofar as this 
one is the container of the subject’s action. Consequently, it is possible to conceive an ethics 
as a dynamic discipline referring to creativity in the universe. This ethical creativity takes 
shape in the development of each subject and of his society. We are now putting forward an 
ethics occupied of values actually recognized, but also an ethics permanently analyzing the 
usefulness of values and norms in order to draw into any society the good that individuals 
seek through their acting; an ethics seeking new forms of the subject’s existence. These points 
configure, in fact, an ethics orientated towards the creative search for new relationships of 
subjects with their environment in which they find their own good. The main objective of 
ethics is the future of man and his society, both tied existentially with the bio-physiological 
world in which they obtain their own good.
Consequently, a dynamic ethics will have some particular characteristics distinguishing 
itself from traditional ethics: the human action is the main concern of ethics, because all 
activity is a permanent interaction with the physical, living and social surroundings, and 
because human action is grounded firstly in the individual and collective past (own experience, 
culture), and secondly in his future, taking the form of desire and tendency towards his 
own good. Besides, these elements or data of human activity (past and future) conform to 
each individual as a moral entity, and in this way man as actor is the main object of ethics 
reflection. Indeed, our actual science, far from being neutral, constitutes the more powerful 
element of an individual’s action and of éthos in our societies.
The Future of Science and Society
Because human acting is the point of confluence of man with his social, physical and 
living surroundings, and because it is the expression of man’s thought, including his past and 
his aspirations, we can see that ethics and culture in any society are tied; indeed, it would be 
said that ethics is the expression of a culture to which ethics provides the elements of duty 
and universality. Such a universality comes from the reach (all that exist) of its norms, and 
their obligatory nature is a force acting through orientation that circumscribes the individual 
acting in his own existence and that of society. 
Today the transforming power of science and technology is part of our culture 
(Gramigna, 2012). Their powerful influence on society is concentrated nowadays in the so-
called emergent technologies, especially in nanosciences and nanotechnologies. Actually, 
nanotechnologies comprise almost all investigation and development of scientific and 
technical activities around the world and obtain great amounts of resources. The main 
significance of emergent technologies for our society comes from the fact that each innovation 
there achieved will bring changes in our lives. This is especially true of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies, because they work with matter at a level where the compounds we know 
are constructed, where the cells of living organisms interchange information, and where 
molecules form themselves. 
The results of nanotechnologies are therefore new materials, much more resistant and 
at the same time lighter, that will change all the artefacts and devices we use in our daily 
lives; they are developing new drugs exactly directed only at the affected cells; new weaves 
for the human body; new, more precise equipment for medical diagnosis; new textiles, new 
materials with new electromagnetic properties able to store in a few nanometres enormous 
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amounts of data, etc. All this is now considered a new revolution that will bring new forms 
of life, a new world, new ways to act in it, new materials, new ways of industrial production, 
new goods, etc. All this will necessarily form a new subject and a new world view, a new 
society with new values, new customs, new forms of existence. This is our modern reality that 
demands of philosophy, particularly ethics, a reflection that, although based on the present 
and the past, is turned specifically to the future where each individual and all of society will 
be living.
It is necessary to go deeper in the ethical reflection based on this changing reality that 
expresses the creative capacity of man and society, specifically today with the nanosciences 
and nanotechnologies (Sancen e Gramigna, 2011). A reflection aiming to change the 
theoretical and material structure now determines the results of S&T to profit from it.
The ethics, which we have only outlined, turns around the creativity that becomes 
actual in the action of each subject. The abstract reflection remains a method for the 
development of ideas. The concrete and unique reality is the only place where everything 
we have indicated would be real. Therefore, ethics, although a philosophical discipline that 
requires abstraction for its development, is grounded in concrete reality. It is at the level 
of each individual’s action that the ethics becomes reality, there that the values and norms 
become present, and where the ethics is diluted, opening the way to the conformation of each 
individual and of his surroundings. The proposal of a creative ethics turned to the future can 
only be real in the thought and the action of each subject.
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